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Employment Law: O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin
Caterers Corp. - Eliminating the Replacement Outside
the Protected Class Element in ADEA Hiring and
Replacement Cases
L Introduction
Discrimination based on age negatively affects not only those discriminated
against but also society as a whole by placing a premium on a presumption of
decreased productivity, rather than continued ability. As life expectancies continue
to rise, discrimination against older Americans will become an even greater issue
in American society. By the year 2010, an expected one-half of the American
workforce will be over the age of forty.' Unlike other protected classes, such as
race and gender, the protected class for discrimination based on one's age is a
milestone that all Americans may reach. As more individuals come within the
protected class of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 19672 (ADEA),
it is likely that more suits alleging discrimination based on age will be filed.
In order to appropriately handle these types of cases, a three-part burden shifting
scheme is used, which includes as its first prong the making of a prima facie case
by the plaintiff? Essentially, a prima facie case of age discrimination is es-
tablished if : (1) the plaintiff is in the age group protected by the ADEA; (2) the
plaintiff is discharged or demoted; (3) at the time of the discharge or demotion, the
plaintiff was performing at a level that met his employer's legitimate expectations;
and (4) following the discharge or demotion, the plaintiff was replaced by someone
with comparable qualifications. A concrete statement of the fourth element is
difficult to achieve based on irregular application in the United States Circuit
Courts of Appeals. However, the United States Supreme Court recently sought to
resolve this irregularity.
On April 1, 1996, the United States Supreme Court unanimously held in
O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.4 that in hiring and replacement
cases brought under the ADEA, a plaintiff is no longer required to show that his
replacement was outside the protected class in order to make a prima facie case
of age discrimination.5 In eliminating this requirement, the Supreme Court cleared
up the disparity among two divergent groups of the United States Courts of
Appeals which have considered the issue. One group of circuit courts required a
1. See BuREAU OF NATL AFFAIRS, INC., OLDER AMERICANS IN THE WORKFORCE: CHALLENGES
AND SOLUT1oNs 15-16 (1987).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
3. See infra notes 36-43 and accompanying text.
4. 116 S. Ct. 1307 (1996).
5. See id. at 1310.
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plaintiff to show that the replacement was outside the protected class,6 while the
other group required some variation of a "younger replacement" standard.7
However, in resolving the confusion on the issue of what need not be shown about
the replacement, the O'Connor Court may have created more disarray for the lower
courts as they will now search for the proper standard to use as the fourth element
in determining a prima facie case of age discrimination.
This note will analyze the Court's decision in O'Connor. Part II of this note will
consider the historical background of the ADEA and how the prima facie scheme
is used in ADEA cases. Part III will give the facts, lower court treatment, and
holdings of O'Connor. Part IV will analyze O'Connor from two perspectives.
First, the Supreme Court's decision will be appraised in terms of the correctness
of the decision. Second, the implications from the O'Connor decision will be
examined. This note will conclude that although O'Connor was correctly decided
and will in fact eliminate some lower court confusion, the Court's failure to set




The ADEA8 was enacted "to promote employment of older persons based on
their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment;
to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the
impact of age on employment."9 The ADEA prohibits age discrimination at all
stages of the employment process, including hiring and firing."0 Discriminatory
practices concerning benefits and privileges of employment are also prohibited."
The prohibitions of the ADEA are "limited to individuals who are at least forty
years of age." 2 Although the ADEA originally placed the minimum permissible
mandatory retirement age at sixty-five, the ADEA Amendments of 1978 raised the
retirement age to seventy. 3 Eight years later Congress again strengthened the
protections of the ADEA by eliminating altogether the mandatory retirement age
for most workers. 4
6. See infra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 113-20 and accompanying text.
8. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
9. Id. § 621(b).
10. See id. § 623(a)(1).
11. See id.
12. See id. § 631.
13. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, 92 Stat.
189.





Prior to passage of the ADEA, Congress directed the Secretary of Labor to
engage in a study of the factors which contribute to age discrimination in
employment and the consequences of that discrimination. 5 The results of the
study were reported to Congress by the Secretary of Labor. 6 The report focused
on the widespread misconception that older workers necessarily have reduced
productivity. This misconception resulted in emotional, physical, and financial
impact on the individuals affected. In addition, this misconception was found to
affect society as a whole by draining national resources as older workers leave the
workplace. 7 The ADEA was enacted by Congress as a result of this report.
Just three years prior to the enactment of the ADEA, the Civil Rights Act of
1964 addressed discrimination on the grounds of race, sex, religion, or national
origin. 8 The legislative history of the ADEA suggests that Congress intended to
provide the same protections in the employment context to persons over the age
of forty as were given gender, racial, ethnic, and religious minorities under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII). 9 With the exception that "age"'
replaces "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,"'" the language of Title VII
and the ADEA is identical.
The similarities between the ADEA and Title VII have not gone unnoticed by
the courts. ' The similarities have allowed courts to employ methods of proof
created in Title VII cases in actions based on the ADEA.' Because of the
usefulness of Title VII methods in proving discrimination under the ADEA, an
exploration of the history of Title VII methods is helpful.
B. Title VII Methods of Proof
1. Disparate Impact
A violation of Title VII can generally be proved in one of two ways. The first
method is the disparate impact theory. Disparate impact is not based on an
employer's intentional discrimination. Rather, it is proved when the employer has
adopted a facially neutral policy that disproportionately affects workers within the
15. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 715, 78 Stat. 241, 265 (superseded by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 10, 86 Stat. 103, 111) (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-14 (1994)).
16. See REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER: AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT (1965).
17. See id.
18. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
19. See 113 CONG. REC. S31,254 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 1967) (statement of Sen. Javits).
20. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1994).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
22. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978)("Mhe prohibitions of the ADEA were derived
in haec verba from Title VII."); Oscar Meyer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979) (observing that
the ADEA and Title VII "share a common purpose, the elimination of discrimination in the workplace").
23. See Loeb v. Textron, 600 F.2d 1003, 1015-17 (lst Cir. 1979).
1997]
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protected group and which cannot be justified by a business necessity.' In Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., the United States Supreme Court explained that any practice
not related to job performance but which excludes a certain race is prohibited.'
The Griggs Court reasoned that "good intent or absence of discriminatory intent
does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as
'built-in headwinds'."' 7
Based on Griggs, a three-part system of proof is used in disparate impact cases.
First, the plaintiff must make a prima facie case of disparate impact, which is often
done through the use of statistical evidence.' Second, if the prima facie case is
made by the plaintiff, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to enunciate
why the practice is a business necessity." If the defendant proves that a business
necessity does exist, the dispute then enters the third and final step of the proof
scheme by shifting the burden of proof back to the plaintiff." In this third phase,
the plaintiff must prove that some alternative practice exists which is not as
discriminatory as that which the employer uses.3
The United States Supreme Court has never held that the disparate impact theory
of recovery is also available to ADEA plaintiffs. Some circuits have, however,
held that the disparate impact theory is applicable under the ADEA.3 Despite the
general acceptance of the disparate impact theory under the ADEA, the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has recently expressly
disallowed its use in ADEA cases.33
2. Disparate Treatment
The second method of proof in Title VII cases is based on a theory of disparate
treatment. Disparate treatment occurs when an employer intentionally discriminates
against an employee on a prohibited basis.' An example of disparate treatment
occurs when an employee suffers some adverse employment decision based on a
protected characteristic of that employee. While the disparate impact method is
most often used by an entire group of employees who are members of the same
protected class, the disparate treatment test typically involves an individual
plaintiff. For example, if an employer's female workers wanted to challenge a
policy which tends to make it more difficult for women to be promoted than men,
the disparate impact theory would be used. An individual female worker who
believes that she was denied a promotion because of her gender would attempt to
24. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971).
25. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
26. Seeid. at 431.
27. Xd. at 432.
28. See id. at 430-31.
29. See id. at 431.
30. See id. at 432.
31. See id.
32. See Monroe v. United Airlines, Inc., 736 F.2d 394, 404 (7th Cir. 1984).
33. See Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1009 (10th Cir. 1996).




prove her case using the disparate treatment theory. The focus of a court's
examination in disparate treatment cases under the ADEA is whether age was a
determining factor in the decision."
a) The McDonnell Douglas Tripartite Scheme
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,' a Title VII race discrimination case,
the United States Supreme Court set forth a tripartite scheme of proof for disparate
treatment cases under Title VII, similar to the one used in cases alleging disparate
impact. Under the first phase, the plaintiff carries the initial burden of stating a
prima facie case of discrimination. The McDonnell Douglas court held that a
prima facie case could be made by showing: "(i) that [plaintiff] belongs to a racial
minority; (ii) that [plaintiff] applied and, was qualified for a job for which the
employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite [plaintiffs] qualifications,
[plaintiff] was rejected; and (iv) that, after [plaintiffs] rejection, the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
[plaintiffs] qualifications."'37 The McDonnell Douglas Court recognized, however,
that those precise elements do not apply to every conceivable fact situation."
If the plaintiff is able to make a prima facie case, the examination then moves
into the second phase of the proof scheme. In the second phase, the burden of
production shifts to the employer to "articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the employee's rejection."39 If the defendant cannot or does not
articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiffs rejection, the presumptioi
of discrimination created by the establishment of plaintiffs prima facie case will
result in a judgment for the plaintiff."
The analysis moves into the third and final phase only if the employer
articulates a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for plaintiffs rejection. At this
final stage, the plaintiff "must... be afforded a fair opportunity to show that [the
employer's] stated reason for [the plaintiffs] rejection was in fact pretext."4 There
are two ways in which a plaintiff can meet the burden of proving pretext.42 The
plaintiff may attempt to show that the stated reason is not credible, or the plaintiff
may try to prove that the protected characteristic more likely than not motivated
the employer.43 In other words, plaintiff will attempt to show that the stated
reason was not the only consideration, and that age was a motivating factor.
35. See Duke v. Uniroyal Inc., 928 F.2d 1413, 1417 (4th Cir. 1991).
36. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
37. Id. at 802.
38. See id. at 802 n.13.
39. Id. at 802.
40. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 n.7 (1981).
41. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
42. See Robert G. Boehrner, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act - Reductions in Force As
America Grays, 28 AM. Bus. L.. 379, 401 (1990).
43. See, e.g., Montana v. First Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n, 869 F.2d 100, 105 (2d Cir. 1989).
1997]
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b) Refining the McDonnell Douglas Standard
Although McDonnell Douglas remains the preeminent case on the disparate
treatment theory, the United States Supreme Court has devoted its efforts since
McDonnell Douglas to refining the way the proof scheme is applied. Most notably,
the Supreme Court has focused on what effect should be given to a prima facie
case once it is established. The progeny of McDonnell Douglas attempt to sharpen
the lines of the application of the scheme of proof.
In Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine," the United States
Supreme Court considered the narrow question of whether the establishment of a
prima facie case of disparate treatment shifted the burden of persuasion to the
defendant." In holding that it did not, the Burdine Court stated that the ultimate
burden of persuasion on the issue of discrimination "remains at all times with the
plaintiff."' Continuing, the Court further stated that "[t]he burden that shifts to
the defendant, therefore, is to rebut the presumption of discrimination by producing
evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone else preferred, for a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason. The defendant need not persuade the court that it was
actually motivated by the proffered reasons." '7 If the defendant meets this burden
of production, the presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted. At this
point, "the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity.""
The level of specificity to which the inquiry would proceed was addressed by
the Supreme Court in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks." The Hicks Court
explained that the McDonnell Douglas framework "is no longer relevant" if the
employer meets the burden of production in the second phase." The Hicks Court
reasoned that producing evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason, even if ultimately
unpersuasive, should place the defendant in a better position than if no attempt was
made to give a reason' The presumptions will have served their purpose by
forcing the defendant to offer up a response. The presumptions will then "drop out
of the picture."' The trier of fact must then proceed to the ultimate question:
whether the plaintiff has proved that the defendant has discriminated against him
based on his protected status"
Because the establishment of the prima facie case of discrimination is most often
what is at issue in disparate treatment cases, the ease with which a prima facie
case can be made must be noted. The Burdine Court stated that the burden is "not
44. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
45. See id. at 250.
46. Id. at 253.
47. Id. at 254.
48. ld at 255.
49. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
50. Id. at 510.
51. See id at 509.
52. Id at 510-11.
53. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol50/iss2/10
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onerous."' The reason for this relatively low litigation hurdle is because of the
important role that the prima facie case serves. The prima facie case eliminates the
two most common nondiscriminatory reasons for a plaintiffs rejection.5 The two
reasons include a lack of qualifications and the absence of a vacancy in the job
sought.' In Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, the Court stated that the
prima facie case
raises an inference of discrimination only because we presume these
acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the
consideration of impermissible factors. And we are willing to presume
this largely because we know from our experience that more often than
not people do not act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any
underlying reasons, especially in a business setting. Thus, when all
legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant have been eliminated as
possible reasons for the employer's actions, it is more likely than not
the employer, who we generally assume acts only with some reason,
based his decision on an impermissible consideration . ."
The purpose of the prima facie case is not to make a final determination on the
ultimate issue, but to simply allow the case to reach the next stage of analysis
under the McDonnell Douglas scheme of proof.
There is a compelling reason why a prima facie case of discrimination under
Title VII is not an "onerous" standard. Rarely will a Title VII plaintiff have a
"smoking gun" - direct evidence - that points to prohibited discrimination. The
McDonnell Douglas approach allows a plaintiff in the most common situations to
establish a case of discrimination through a set of presumptions based on the
behavior of the employer. The external actions of the employer which are adverse
to the plaintiff may often be the only evidence of which the plaintiff has any
knowledge. In such a situation, the McDonnell Douglas framework allows a
plaintiff to get his case off the ground.
c) Applicability of the McDonnell Douglas Framework in ADEA Disparate
Treatment Cases
Although originally constructed for use in Title VII cases, courts have routinely
held that the McDonnell Douglas framework is applicable to cases which are
brought under the ADEA.59 Although the United States Supreme Court has never
54. Id
55. See id. at 253-54.
56. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44 (1977).
57. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
58. Id at 577 (citation omitted).
59. See Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1008 (1st Cir. 1979); Pena v. Brattleboro Retreat, 702
F.2d 322, 323-24 (2d Cir. 1983); Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1239 (3d Cir. 1977); Smith v.
Flax, 618 F.2d 1062, 1066 n.3 (4th Cir. 1980); Marshall v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 730,
735 (5th Cir. 1977); Tice v. Lampert Yards, Inc., 761 F.2d 1210, 1212 (7th Cir. 1985); Cova v. Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 574 F.2d 958, 959 (8th Cir. 1978); Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 531 (9th Cir.
19971
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explicitly held that McDonnell Douglas was applicable to ADEA cases, the Court
has assumed the applicability of McDonnell Douglas in dicta.'
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit examined the issue in
Loeb v. Textron, Inc.6" Noting that McDonnell Douglas is a "sensible, orderly way
to evaluate the evidence" in employment discrimination cases,6 the Loeb court
found no reason why the McDonnell Douglas scheme would not be as helpful in
a discrimination case based on age as in Title VII cases.' Finding nothing in the
legislative history of Title VII or the ADEA indicating any intent to the contrary,
the Loeb court reasoned that the similarities between the two statutes indicate that
"one naturally might expect to use the same methods and burdens of proof under
the ADEA as under Title VII."" Additionally, the Tenth Circuit acknowledged
the applicability of McDonnell Douglas in ADEA cases in Kentroti v. Frontier
Airlines, Inc.'
Although the general consensus does seem to be that the McDonnell Douglas
framework applies to ADEA cases, one court has noted that the McDonnell
Douglas framework should not be adopted wholesale and rigidly applied to ADEA
cases. In Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., the Sixth Circuit stated that while it may
be reasonable to assume that McDonnell Douglas can be applied in age
discrimination cases, "it would be inappropriate simply to borrow and apply [the
McDonnell Douglas framework] automatically" because the ADEA and Title VII
are separate statutes with independent histories.' However, the Laugesen court
stated that it would be reasonable to assume that in a proper case, the McDonnell
Douglas framework could be applied.' The Sixth Circuit has in fact applied
McDonnell Douglas in subsequent decisions.' However, the apprehensions of the
Laugesen court may be allayed by the fact that courts have consistently opined that
the McDonnell Douglas framework is not "inflexible,""0 and that the framework
was not intended to be applied in a manner that is "rigid, mechanized, or
ritualistic."'"
1981); Kentroti v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., 585 F.2d 967, 969 (10th Cir. 1978); Buckley v. Hosp. Corp.
of Am., 758 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1985).
60. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985). TWA claimed that the
respondents had failed to make out a prima facie case of age discrimination under McDonnell Douglas.
The Court rejected this argument reasoning that the McDonnell Douglas framework is "inapplicable
where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination." Id.
61. 600 F.2d 1003 (1:;t Cir. 1979).
62. Id. at 1014 (quoting Fumco Constr. Corp v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)).
63. See id. at 1015.
64. Id.
65. 585 F.2d 967, 969 (10th Cir. 1978).
66. 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975).
67. Id. at 312.
68. See id.
69. See, e.g., LaGrant v. Gulf & Western Mfg. Co., 748 F.2d 1087, 1090 (6th Cir. 1984).
70. Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1008 (1st Cir. 1979).




Despite the acceptance of the use of the McDonnell Douglas framework in
ADEA disparate treatment cases, confusion among the United States Circuit Courts
of Appeal has caused the fourth element of the McDonnell Douglas framework to
be applied irregularly. The McDonnell Douglas conception of the fourth element
requires an examination of whether the position remained open to applicants of the
plaintiffs qualifications. However, in ADEA cases the fourth element has been
used to examine the characteristics of the plaintiff employee's replacement. The
United States Supreme Court eliminated some of this confusion in the decision of
O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.' In O'Connor, the Court con-
sidered the question of whether a showing of a replacement outside the protected
class was a proper element of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case.' In
holding that this was not a proper element, the Court brought the Fourth and Sixth
Circuits within the majority of other Circuits.7 However, although the O'Connor
decision may appear to eliminate this confusion in the lower courts, the lack of a
clear statement by the O'Connor Court as to a uniform way in which to apply the
fourth element may allow some disparity to continue in the future.
III. O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.
A. Facts
James O'Connor began his employment with Consolidated Coin Caterers
Corporation (Consolidated) in 1978. Consolidated operated cafeterias and vending
machines which were primarily used in industrial plants, schools, businesses, and
other facilities. In 1986, O'Connor was serving Consolidated in the capacity of
general manager for Consolidated's northern region, known as "4C's North."
'75
Under the management of O'Connor, 4C's North showed "significant improvement
in financial performance" during 1989.7: 6 During the same year, O'Connor's perfor-
mance rating also increased, to a "commendable minus."' In addition, O'Connor
earned the largest incentive bonus in the company for that year.7
Despite the satisfactory performance of 4C's North during 1989, the 4C's South
region was not operating as profitably. In December 1989, O'Connor accepted
Consolidated's offer to transfer to 4C's South as general manager in an effort to
make that region more profitable. O'Connor continued to be directly supervised by
Consolidated's President, Ed Williams.
In July 1990, a chain of events were set into motion which eventually led to the
loss of O'Connor's job. Part of O'Connor's 4C's South region was assigned to 4C's
North, effectively reducing O'Connor's territory. Williams claimed that this was
72. 116 S. Ct. 1307 (1996).
73. See id. at 1308.
74. See id. at 1309-10.
75. O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 56 F.3d 542, 543 (4th Cir. 1995).
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due to O'Connor's "slow responses in reacting to individual problem accounts" and
the fact that O'Connor "had not timely responded to a problem involving food
delivery in unrefigerated trucks."" However, Williams conceded that O'Connor
had "made progress with individual accounts and [4C's] South made some
improvement."'
A second major event also took place later that month. Williams consolidated
all of 4C's operations, reducing the number of regional divisions from four to two.
Alan Hunter, age fifty-seven, was demoted from a regional manager position to a
commission salesman. O'Connor, age fifty-six, was terminated. The two
employees retained to oversee the new regional operations were Ted Finnell, age
forty, and Mike Kiser, age thirty-five. 1 Finnell's new region included what was
formerly known as 4C's South, O'Connor's area.'
Finnell took over fhe region formerly covered by O'Connor despite a disparity
in O'Connor's and Finnell's performance ratings for the previous year. O'Connor
had earned a "commendable minus" in 1989, which was a higher rating than the
"competent minus" earned by Finnell.' The performance ratings were made by
Williams, who supervised both O'Connor and Finnell.
Williams had made various comments indicating that O'Connor's age was a
problem. Williams made a statement early in the summer of 1990 while some
Consolidated employees were in a company conference room watching the Monday
playoff at the U.S. Open golf tournament. O'Connor stated that he "couldn't walk
that many rounds of golf for five days to play 18 holes for five days."' This
comment drew a response from Williams that O'Connor was just "too old."'
Approximately two weeks prior to O'Connor's discharge, Williams stated:
"O'Connor you are too damn old for this kind of work."' In response to this
statement by Williams, O'Connor asked the Human Relations Manager, seated in
another office but within earshot, if she had heard the statement. The Human
Relations Manager responded by telling Williams that he "shouldn't say things like
that.
'8
Two days before O'Connor's discharge, Williams made another similar
statement. In response to another Consolidated employee's statement that he was
approaching his fiftieth birthday, Williams stated "[i]t's about time we get some
young blood in this company."' This statement was made while O'Connor,
Williams, and the other employee were riding in a company car.
79. Id.
80. O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 56 F.3d 542, 547 (4th Cir. 1995).
81. See id. at 544.
82. See id.
83. O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 829 F. Supp. 155, 159 (W.D.N.C. 1993); Brief
of Petitioner at 2, O'Connor (No. 95-354).
84. O'Connor, 56 F.3d at 549.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 549.
87. Brief of Petitioner at 5, O'Connor (No. 95-354).




Additionally, Williams called a Consolidated salesman into his office the day
after O'Connor was fired. When the salesman asked why O'Connor had been fired,
Williams said "that all of us were getting old, that [O'Connor] was getting old, and
that there were three other persons around the office who were turning [fifty]."'
When Williams learned that the salesman was telling others that O'Connor was
fired because he was too old, Williams confronted the salesman. The salesman
informed Williams that he only repeating what Williams had told him, to which
Williams made no reply.'
B. Lower Court Treatment
O'Connor brought suit against Consolidated in the United States District Court
for the Western District of North Carolina for violating the ADEA.9" O'Connor
attempted to rely on the McDonnell Douglas framework for disparate treatment as
a means of making a prima facie case of age discrimination. Consolidated moved
for summary judgment. Noting that the Fourth Circuit precedent required proof of
"replacement outside the protected class" as the fourth element of the prima facie
case, the district court held that O'Connor could not make out a prima facie
case.' Finnell, O'Connor's replacement, was forty years of age, and therefore
O'Connor could not meet the fourth element of the McDonnell Douglas scheme.93
The district court also considered whether -O'Connor could make his case using
direct evidence - the various statements by Williams.' The court concluded that
O'Connor could not establish a nexus between the statements and the employment
decision." Because O'Connor could not make out a prima facie case using the
McDonnell Douglas scheme and could not present traditional direct or indirect
evidence, Consolidated's motion for summary judgment was granted."
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals also concluded that O'Connor could not
establish a prima facie case because he was not replaced by someone outside the
protected class.' Additionally, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the lower court that
the statements which O'Connor relied on were "simply stray comments that do not
establish evidence of age discrimination."9 Despite an interesting opinion by
Senior Circuit Judge Butzner, who concurred in part and dissented in part," the
89. Brief of Petitioner at 5-6, O'Connor (No. 95-354).
90. See Brief of Petitioner at 6, O'Connor (No. 95-354).
91. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
92. O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 829 F. Supp 155, 157-58 (W.D.N.C. 1993).
93. See id. at 158.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 160.
97. See O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 56 F.3d 542, 546 (4th Cir. 1995).
98. Id. at 550.
99. See id. at 550-51 (Butzner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Butzner
"reluctantly concur[red]" with the conclusion that O'Connor could not make out a prima facie case
because he was not replaced by someone outside the protected class. Opining that "[sluch an absolute
requirement... has no justification in law or policy," Judge Butzner pointed to the majority of circuits
which have eschewed such a requirement. Judge Butzner dissented from the conclusion that O'Connor
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Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court judgment."
C. The United States Supreme Court Decision
The only issue considered by the Supreme Court on appeal was whether a
plaintiff alleging a discharge in violation of the ADEA must show that the
plaintiffs replacement was under the age of forty to establish a prima facie case
based on the McDonnell Douglas scheme.'"' The application of Title VII
framework to ADEA cases was not contested by the parties. Although the Court
did not decide whether the application was correct, it was so assumed.'" In an
opinion by Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, the O'Connor Court held
that replacement by someone outside the protected class is "not a proper element
of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case."'
The O'Connor Court noted that the ADEA prohibits discrimination based on an
individual's age, but limits the protected class.'" Elaborating on the need to focus
on the characteristics of the affected individual, the O'Connor Court opined that
"[t]he fact that one person in the protected class has lost out to another person
outside the protected class is thus irrelevant, so long as he lost out because of his
age."' 5 The Court attempted to put this statement in more "concrete" terms by
stating that "there can be no greater inference of age discrimination ... when a
[forty] year-old is replaced by a [thirty-nine] year old than when a [fifty-six] year-
old is replaced by a [forty] year-old."'"M
The O'Connor Court reasoned that the Fourth Circuit's rule was likely adopted
to prevent the creation of a prima facie case in an instance when a sixty-eight year
old is replaced by a sixty-five year old."7 However, this "utterly irrelevant"
element is not the "proper solution."'" Because the ADEA prohibits
discrimination lased on age and not class membership, "the fact that a replacement
is substantially younger than the plaintiff is a far more reliable indicator of age
discrimination than is the fact that the plaintiff was replaced by someone outside
the protected class.""TM The O'Connor Court did not explicitly set forth what
should constitute the fourth element. One must assume that the O'Connor Court
either intended to leave the question open or intended its "substantially younger"
language to provide some guidance to the lower courts.
failed to raise an inference of discrimination using ordinary methods of proof based on the many
statements by Williams. Sce id.
100. See id. at 550.
101. See O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 116 S. Ct. 1307, 1309 (1996).
102. See id. at 1309-10.











A. Confusion Among the Courts of Appeal: The Need for O'Connor
The malleable nature of the McDonnell Douglas framework can be illustrated
when applied to ADEA cases based on "hiring and replacement" situations. Courts
seem to uniformly apply the first three elements. In iome form or another, the
plaintiff is required to show that he was within the protected class (over forty), that
he was discharged or demoted, and that at the time of the adverse event he was
performing at a level that met the employer's legitimate expectations."'
The irregularity in the application of the McDonnell Douglas scheme to hiring-
and-replacement cases is exemplified in requirements that the United States Circuit
Courts of Appeal have used for the fourth element. The Fourth and Sixth Circuits
require that a plaintiff must have been replaced by someone outside the protected
class in order to be able to carry the fourth element."' Although other courts
have also required this showing,"' the Fourth and Sixth Circuits have been the
most ardent users of the standard.
However, close to a majority of United States Courts of Appeals do not require
a showing of replacement outside the protected class."' Even among the rest of
the United States Circuit Courts that do not require a replacement outside the
protected class, the fourth element has still not been uniformly applied. In Roper
v. Peabody Coal Co.,"' the Seventh Circuit applied the fourth element by stating
that "the disparity in age must be sufficient to create an inference of age
discrimination.""..5 In Rinehart v. City of Independence,"6 the Eighth Circuit
stated that the plaintiff does not have to show replacement by someone outside the
protected class, but only that he was "replaced by someone younger. ' The First
Circuit in Loeb v. Textron, Inc."' implied that a prima facie case of age
discrimination could be made even if no one else was brought in to perform the
same work after the discharge."' The Loeb court even suggested that a prima facie
110. See EEOC v. Western Elec. Co., 713 F.2d 1011, 1014 (4th Cir. 1983).
111. See id.; LaPointe v. UAW Local 600, 8 F.3d 376, 379 (6th Cir. 1993). Additionally, the 11th
Circuit has used the "replacement outside the class" standard, but has refused to strictly apply it. See,
e.g., Walker v. Nationsbank of Fla., N.A., 53 F.3d 1548, 1556. But see Carter v. City of Miami, 870
F.2d 578, 583 (11 th Cir. 1989) (holding that age discrimination plaintiffs inability to show that she was
replaced by someone outside the protected class was not an absolute bar to establishment of a prima facie
case).
112. See, e.g., Price v. Maryland Cas. Co., 561 F.2d 609, 612 (5th Cir. 1977).
113. See Kralman v. Illinois Dept. of Veterans' Affairs, 23 F.3d 150, 155 (7th Cir. 1994); Lowe v.
Commack Union Free School Dist., 886 F.2d 1364, 1374 (2d Cir. 1989); Freeman v. Package Mach.
Corp., 865 F.2d 1331, 1335 n.2 (1st Cir. 1988); Maxfield v. Sinclair Int'l, 766 F.2d 788, 792 (3d Cir.
1985); Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 532-33, (9th Cir. 1981).
114. 47 F.3d 925 (7th Cir. 1995).
115. Id. at 927; see also Kralman, 23 F.3d at 156.
116. 35 F.3d 1263 (8th Cir. 1994).
117. Id. at 1265.
118. 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979).
119. See id. at 1014.
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case of age discrimination could be made if the replacement was older than the
discharged employee opining that "the replacement could have been hired... to
ward off a discrimination suit."'' "
The way in which the fourth element of the prima facie case is applied could
drastically affect whether a plaintiff can make a prima facie case. While a
plaintiff may be able to show that he was replaced by someone younger, he may
not be able to show that he was replaced by someone substantially younger.
Depending on the court, the plaintiff may or may not survive the first stage of the
McDonnell Douglas scheme of proof. Likewise, a plaintiff in a jurisdiction that
does not consider the age of the replacement, like Loeb, would likely be able to
meet the prima facie case if he met the first three elements. Clearly, a need for
uniformity in the fourth element's application exists.
B. Evaluation of the O'Connor Decision
The decision of tle United States Supreme Court in O'Connor appears to be the
correct one. The O'Connor Court correctly noted that the ADEA prohibits
discrimination based on age, not class membership."' In this sense, the central
issue is whether the age of the terminated employee was determinative in the
decision.'" In essence, this investigation is little more than a "but for" test.
Based on the plain language of the ADEA, the investigation should necessarily
focus on characteristics of the employee who received the adverse employment
decision." The McDonnell Douglas framework examines the situation with
emphasis on the employee discharged, not the replacement. The original
McDonnell Douglas framework as applied in Title VII cases looked only at the
class the employee was in, whether he was qualified, whether he was fired, and
whether the position remained open after the discharge.'"4 Thus, it seems that
a consideration of characteristics of the replacement employee should be
irrelevant to the establishment of a prima facie case under the ADEA.
Although McDonnell Douglas instructs that the characteristics of the
replacement are not considered, consideration of the replacement's characteristics
could potentially b, quite helpful. When employing the McDonnell Douglas
framework in the hiring and replacement context, the fact that the replacement is
outside the protected class will often be the most probative evidence of age
discrimination. The probative nature of this kind of evidence cannot be denied.
The purpose of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is to create an inference
of discrimination. Although replacement characteristics are undoubtedly probative,
the application of the Fourth Circuit's rule in O'Connor does not necessarily
create a stronger inference of discrimination, as the O'Connor Court accurately
120. Id. at 1013 n.9.
121. See O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 116 S. Ct. 1307, 1310 (1996).
122. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,253 (1981); Duke v. Uniroyal
Inc., 928 F.2d 1413, 1417 (4th Cir. 1991).
123. See 29 U.S.C. -623(a)(1). The statute provides: "It shall be unlawful for an employer: to fail
or refuse to hire or discharge any individual... because of such individual's age." Id. (emphasis added).





If the purpose of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is to create an
inference of discrimination, one might attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of the
test in a case where discrimination has arguably occurred. In O'Connor, the
plaintiff attempted to use both the prima facie case and traditional methods of
proof to prove discrimination. The Fourth Circuit's rulings in O'Connor, that no
inference of discrimination could be created through the prima facie case and that
there was not enough direct or indirect evidence to prove discrimination," show
that a prima facie standard which includes an outside the protected class element
is not effective. Despite the fact that there was direct evidence of "ageist"
statements by O'Connor's supervisor on four occasions in the months surrounding
O'Connor's termination, the district court in O'Connor found that there was
insufficient evidence to create a inference under the prima facie system.
Regardless of the relative connection of the statements to the ultimate
employment decision, a bald examination of the facts indicates that it is quite
likely that O'Connor was terminated because of his age. O'Connor was a fifty-six-
year-old man with a good work record who was terminated and replaced by
someone sixteen years younger. Both O'Connor and the replacement, whose
employment record was of a lower caliber than O'Connor's, were supervised by
the individual who made derogatory statements about O'Connor's age on repeated
occasions. For the prima facie system to contain an element which would not
allow the creation of an inference of discrimination based on these facts
justifiably calls the element's effectiveness into question based on the stated
purpose of the prima facie framework.
The elimination of the replacement outside the protected class rule was proper
because of the lack of application to all situations of age discrimination. In
management and professional situations, it is unlikely that a person outside the
protected class could be found with sufficient experience and qualifications to fill
some positions. This scenario could manifest itself through two situations. First,
an employee could be terminated and, if the employer is unable to find a
replacement with suitable qualifications under the age of forty, the employer
might again fill the position with someone over forty."z Second, the employer
might intentionally hire from within the protected class to eliminate suspicion of
an age-based decision to terminate. The latter is an example which was first set
out in Loeb v. Textron, Inc."
Although there are certain professional situations that are conceivable in which
a replacement below forty could be just as qualified, they are few. Doctors,
lawyers, nurses, business people, and engineers are all professions in which
125. See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
127. See Brief of Petitioner at 16, O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 116 S. Ct. 1307
(1996) (No. 95-354).
128. 600 F.2d 1003, 1012 n.9 (Ist Cir. 1979).
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experience greatly increases one's occupational value.'" Further, rarely in these
fields will an employer be able to find an individual with such qualifications and
experience unless that person has been engaged in that profession for many years.
As the level of expe-ience and expertise increases, so does the likelihood that the
terminated employee is within the protected class. Accordingly, the likelihood that
a person under forty possesses comparable experience and expertise decreases.
What the younger replacement may lack in experience may be more than made
up in his economic value to the company. Regardless of the quality of the
replacement's work, it is possible that a determinative factor in the hiring decision
is the amount of money that can be saved by his employment. A younger
employee's advantages might be a lower salary, less accrued paid vacation,
smaller bonuses based on length of time with the company, and a perception of
the lower costs of medical benefits for younger employees. In situations in which
one's experience contributes greatly to occupational value, it is difficult at best to
justify a decision to replace a protected employee with someone younger based
solely on economic factors.
Admittedly, nonprofessional and unskilled occupations exist in which an
individual with relatively little experience could perform at a level similar to that
of a more experienced person. However, it is difficult to justify the "outside the
protected class" rule based solely on the fact that some occupations exist in which
it is likely that a replacement might be outside the class. The mere ability to
conjure hypotheticals is no justification for keeping the "outside the protected
class" element.
Under the ADEA, a court's duty is to determine whether the employee was
discharged because of his age.'" Whatever the usefulness of the outside the
class element in some situations, application of that element could clearly lead to
the ineffective application of the prima facie standard in that the element
precludes an inference of discrimination from being created in a case with
considerable evidence of discrimination. The ADEA could not be fairly
administered in all cases of disparate treatment unless the outside the protected
class requirement is eliminated.
C. Implications of O'Connor
The United States Supreme Court in O'Connor spoke to what standard should not
be used for the fourth element; unfortunately, the Court did not speak to what
standard should be used for that element of a prima facie case. The outside the
protected class standard was compared to and found to be a less reliable indicator
of age discrimination than a "substantially younger" replacement. 3' Assuming that
the disparity in age must be substantial enough to create an inference of
discrimination, the substantially younger replacement standard is also problematic
for two reasons. First, the substantially younger standard still considers characteris-
129. See Brief of Petitioner at 20, O'Connor (No. 95-354).
130. See supra note. 122-23.




tics of the replacement.' This ignores the fact that a person in the protected class
might be terminated because of his age but may still be replaced by someone who
may not be "substantially" younger, if younger at all. The substantially younger rule
might still potentially lead to ineffective application of the prima facie framework
because it removes the focus from whether age was the determining factor in the
employment decision.
Second, the potential for uneven application of this standard is great because the
outcome will necessarily be tied to a court's concept of "substantial". A court could
interpret "substantially younger" in two different ways. A court may require a
showing that the replacement is substantially younger in a literal sense. Alter-
natively, substantially younger could be interpreted as merely requiring that the age
difference be "substantial" enough to create an inference of discrimination.
Whichever way the courts interpret the substantially younger standard could have
a great effect on the end result of the litigation. For example, a five-year age
difference would probably not be substantial in a literal sense but might be
substantial enough to create the inference of age discrimination to move the case
along to the next stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework.
What, then, should the standard for the fourth prong of the prima facie test be?
A plaintiff should be able to survive the prima facie phase merely by showing that
he was replaced. This conclusion is supported by two reasons. First, the original
McDonnell Douglas standard as applicable to Title VII cases only required that an
employer continue to seek applicants for the position.' By not considering the
characteristics of the eventual replacement, the most even-handed application was
assured." Admittedly, the Court since McDonnell Douglas has added a
replacement outside the class standard in Title VII cases. 3S However, this standard
132. Although considering the characteristics of the replacement is undoubtedly probative, the
ADEA expressly provides that the central issue is whether the plaintiff was discriminated against
"because of [plaintiffs] age". 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1994). When the ADEA was introduced in the
Senate, it was stated that "the Bill specifically prohibits discrimination against any "individual" because
of his age. It does not say that the discrimination has to be in favor of someone younger than forty. In
other words, if two individuals age 52 and 42 apply for the same job and the employer selected the man
age 42... because he is younger than the man age 52, then he will have violated the law". 113 CONG.
REc. 31,255 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 1967) (statement of Sen. Javits).
133. In McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff was a black male who sought to be rehired, but was
denied. The Court held that the plaintiff could establish a prima facie case by showing that the employer
continued to seek applicants for position. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
134. Not considering the replacement's characteristics ensures that a plaintiff may avail himself to
the ADEA's protections even if replaced by a fellow member of the protected class. See 29 C.F.R. §
1625.2(a) (1996) ("[Ihf two people apply for the same position, and one is 42 and the other is 52, the
employer may not lawfully turn down either one on the basis of age, but must make the decision on the
basis of some other factor."); Maxfield v. Sinclair Int'l, 766 F.2d 788, 792 (3d Cir. 1985) ("If no intra-age
group protection were provided by the ADEA, it would be of virtually no use to persons at the upper
ages of the protected class. .. ").
135. See Meinecke v. H & R Block of Houston, 66 F.3d 77, 83 (5th Cir. 1995)("To establish a
prima facie case... under Title VII, a plaintiff must prove ... (4) after being discharged, her employer
replaced her with a person who is not a member of the protected class."); Talley v. Bravo Pitino
Restaurant, Ltd., 61 F.3d 1241, 1247 (6th Cir. 1995)(Under Title VII, the fourth prong is satisfied "by
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should not be extended to ADEA cases.'" Title VII protects characteristics which
are immutable, and not ones of degree like age. Although the replacement outside
the protected class rule may be effective when judging binary characteristics like
being female or Native American, the rule loses its effectiveness in the age context
because an "old versus not old" distinction is entirely too slippery.
Second, a rule which requires only mere replacement is consistent with the
stringency of the prima facie standard. Courts have repeatedly described the prima
facie standard as one which is "not onerous" to indicate the ease in which a plaintiff
should be able to meet the standard.'37 An employee over forty who is performing
at a satisfactory level but who is still terminated and replaced should be able to
survive the first phase of the framework, especially considering the probability that
the plaintiff will have no access to evidence of any discriminatory intent.
One possible argument against the O'Connor decision is that by eliminating the
replacement outside tie class element, an increase in age discrimination cases which
survive the prima facie stage will result. Indeed, this is quite possible. If, as
statistics show, one out of every two workers will be forty or over by the year
2010,"' it will becore even less likely that a replacement could be from outside
the class. This assumes that the increase in the raw numbers of employees in the
protected class will also lead to an increase in number of situations in which a
protected individual i3 replaced by another protected individual. As America ages,
claims of discrimination by protected employees replaced by another within the
protected class could becoming an increasing trend.
In assessing whether this trend will have a negative effect on private employers,
two things must be remembered. First, the purpose of the prima facie case itself is
partly to weed out meritiess claims, which is accomplished by eliminating the most
common reasons for an employee's termination - lack of qualification or
satisfactory performance and lack of a position.'39 Employers will still have some
solace, although admittedly very little, in the fact that an employee will first have
to meet the prima facie case.
Second, employers3 are still going to be able to offer a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason if the employee survives the prima facie stage. The closer the
ages of the employees, the weaker the inference of discrimination. Employers might
be able to defeat such a claim with a minimal business justifi6ation.
This brings the discussion to the "bottom line" in the private employment sector.
Although employers may argue that this change will burden them and possibly
increase the amount of time that they spend defending litigation, one must
a showing either that the plaintiff was replaced by a person outside of the protected class or that
similarly situated non-protcted employees were treated more favorably than the plaintiff."); Walker v.
Nationsbank of Fla., N.A., 53 F.3d 1548, 1556 (1lth Cir. 1995)(Under Title VII and ADEA "employee
establishes a prima fade case ... when the employee shows... replacement with a person outside the
protected class.").
136. See supra notes 113-20.
137. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note I and accompanying text.




remember that the employer, at least in part, controls his own destiny. An employer
will be relatively safe from liability based on age discrimination if the employer will
simply not make employment decisions based on the age of an employee. Just as
importantly, employers should take an affirmative duty to educate its employees in
two regards. First, employees must be implored to keep from making employment
decisions based on age. Second, employers must deter other employees from
making "ageist" statements which could lead an adversely affected employee to
believe the decision was based on his age.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has sided with the majority in not requiring
a showing of a replacement outside the protected class as an element of the prima
facie case." Although the O'Connor decision will not explicitly contravene the
decisions of the Tenth Circuit which consider the ADEA in the hiring and
replacement context, it does however leave the door open for disparity among the
circuits. Because the O'Connor Court did not set forth what the standard should be,
the lower courts must necessarily decide for themselves. Considering the differences
among the United States Circuit Courts of Appeal in how they applied the majority
rule, it is certainly foreseeable that they will again differ on how the fourth element
should be applied. O'Connor no doubt resolved some confusion among the Circuits;
we can only hope that it did not create more.
V. Conclusion
The McDonnell Douglas framework is an invaluable resource to ADEA plaintiffs.
Because age discrimination is often a matter of degree, the framework gives
plaintiffs an opportunity to prove their case despite the fact that no direct or indirect
evidence exists. Undoubtedly, the prima facie standard should be constructed in
such a way that will not provide for arbitrary or irrational application. The United
States Supreme Court has eliminated some of this arbitrariness with its decision in
O'Connor. The ADEA unequivocally prohibits discrimination based on one's age.
Although probative, characteristics of a replacement should not be required as a part
of the prima facie case. However, in eliminating this requirement, the O'Connor
Court failed to give us a concrete requirement in its place, which may lead to more
disparity among the circuits. Cases which are seemingly identical factually may
produce different results depending on how courts chose to apply the fourth
element. -Potentially, courts might try to follow the limited guidance in O'Connor,
but will then have to wrestle with the amorphous "substantial" standard. Alter-
natively, courts might construe the lack of guidance in O'Connor as a green light
to apply the fourth element standard of their choice, which plainly could result in
a judicial disaster. Only time will tell exactly what impact the O'Connor decision
has on employers, employees, and the courts.
David G. Harris
140. See Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 836 F.2d 1544, 1547 (10th Cir. 1988).
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